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Abstract 
This thesis examines Jacques Derrida's deconstructive 
critique of the logocentric concept of meaning and.proposes 
that Derrida's critique maintains the importance of authorial 
intention for literary critical practice. Derrida's 
critique of 'meaning' entails a situating of authorial 
intention as that which, while of importance to a critical 
reading, is incapable of absolutely determining the 'meaning' 
of the text. 
The introduction gives a brief sketch of the _importance 
of authorial intention in modern literary theory. Chapter One 
articulates Derrida's critique of Saussure's concept of the 
sign, showing how such a critique entails a questioning of 
any meaning beyond the series of differences which is language. 
Chapter Two demonstrates how Derrida's deconstructive reading 
of Rousseau in the latter half of Of Grammatology situates 
Rousseau's intention as that which is incapable of fully 
determining the meaning of his "Essay on the Origin 
of Languages", due to the undecidable meaning of the 
word 'supplement'. The third and final chapter is 
concerned with Derrida's postulation of the 'graphematic 
structure of the mark' as that which characterises all 
forms of speech and writing, as well as the structure 
of intention. The 'graphematic structure of the mark' 
is seen by Derrida as being that which renders the concept 
of a fully closed and final 'meaning' a problematical 
one due to the mark's ability to be grafted from one 
context into another. The chapter ends with an account of 
the'concept' of 'dissemination', and demonstrates how 
this concept differs from the traditional concept of 
'meaning'. 
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Introduction 
How does one begin to interpret a text that denies 
the very logic of interpretative thought, and hence 
undercuts the reader's every move to assimilate 
its meaning into some kind of ordered intelligibility?l 
Derrida and meaning. Or if reversed, meaning 
and Derrida. What does such a title mean? What borderlines, 
margins and areas does it hope to delimit? Which meaning 
of 'meaning' is meant? Which - given the dual processes 
of reading and translation - Derrida? 
finally readable? 
Is such a title 
The raising of such questions and the inquiry into 
the possibility of their being answerable is typical 
of post-structuralism's strategy of asking questions 
instead of attempting to answer them. It is a dangerous 
enterprise, for in doing so post-structuralism is deliberately 
working against, and yet within, the practice of traditional 
criticism, a criticism which has had as its rule of 
thumb (be it any number of divergent schools; New Critical, 
Existential, Reader-response, Archetypal) the conviction 
that questions raised - leaving aside for a moment the 
range of issues that such a conviction opens for discussion -
by the text, or reader, or rhetorically by the critic, are 
capable of being answered. Post-structuralism operates 
not exactly on different tenets but rather on no tenets 
at all; questions are endless and answers are only always 
other questions in the process of being asked. As the 
proliferation of readings of any one text shows, criticism, 
despite its often avowed intentions, raises further questions 
concerning the text under its scrutiny. As one of its 
'tenets' post-structuralism argues that there can be no 
final 'conclusive' reading of a text. The position that 
there can be no final conclusive reading is held by post-
structuralism as being the correct way to view the text. 
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It is the modern day scepticism of Derrida - a sceptisicm 
witnessed in his constant asking of questions without believing 
in the possibility of their being answered conclusively, 
in his having no new model of meaning to offer but that 
of the questioning of all models - that makes a clear exposition 
of what is meant by 'Derrida and meaning' impossible. 
For a clear exposition in the case of Derrida's work would 
be an unclear distortion. To make Derrida 'clear' is to 
cloud, for it is a notorious trait of Derrida's writing 
to be difficult, to hide meaning so as to reveal what makes 
possible meaning's revelation. Derrida's work is somewhat 
paradoxical as on the one hand it presents the reader with 
an exposition on what allows any text, be it written or 
spoken, to signify, yet on the other hand it declares the 
impossibility of such an unveiling. The reader is caught, 
like a Zen student in the grips of a paradoxical koan, between 
a feeling of knowing what is being said and precisely because 
one knows what is being said, a feeling of not knowing what 
is being said. This dual sensation is an illustration 
of Derrida's point (in his essay "Signature Event Context'') 
that one can never fully say anything, that meaning is always 
already incomplete, for to be able to mean, to be able to 
signify, is to be a part of a sign system which has as one 
of its fundamental features the capacity for re-iteration. 
The bundle of words that constitutes the text of Derrida's 
work has the capacity - because they are words - to mean, 
to signify something, and yet this meaning can never be 
totally determined nor absolutely fixed because the words 
themselves can be cited, repeated, translated, re-contextualised 
so as to change their meaning. Traditionally the notion 
of an original meaning, an original context, has served 
as a touchstone, a centre, for our conceptions of language 
and how it works. Derrida challenges the security of such 
a centre, making his work - and how we read the works of 
others - a matter of ambiguity, a matter of seeking out 
centres so as to show their limitations, their failure to 
be the centres which they propose they are. 
Still, to make such claims about the meaning of meaning 
and not be dismissed as inconsequential, mad, or both, one 
has to employ certain strategies. One has to be to some 
degree convincing. Post-structuralism and Deconstruction 
is stimulating a good deal of debate in many university 
departments, a good indication that it is convincing enough 
to inspire both support and opposition. One can, of course, 
cite numerous cultural reasons why the world, especially 
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the West, is undertaking a questioning of its own interpretive 
ground-rules: namely the series of theoretical revolutions 
that mark the modern epoch, beginning with Copernicus and 
continuing with Darwin, Freud, Einstein and, for some, Saussure. 
Derrida takes full advantage of these revolutions, reminding 
us constantly that our frame of reference is about to be 
changed and that the implication of such a series of changes 
is that an absolute frame of reference does not, and indeed 
cannot, exist. Derrida has no new model, no new frame 
of reference, to offer us. His position on meaning is 
in fact a re-reading, a critique, of Saussure's postulation 
of the sign and his subsequent 'structuralist' linguistics. 
Derrida's reading of Saussure is a double one, one working 
within Saussure's premises while at the same time inhabiting 
Saussure so as to work against - by disclosing how such 
premises stand in opposition to certain established hierarchies 
the metaphysical presuppositions of the text. 
No literary, or philosophical, work is written, or assumes 
importance, in an historical void. To understand the impact 
and relevance of Derrida's work it is necessary to take note 
of the context in which Derrida's work appears. However, this 
context is difficult to determine for a variety of reasons, 
for the context surrounding Derrida's work is the problematic 
'context' of a cultural, linguistic, and inter-disciplinary 
exchange. It is an exchange which is nowhere present at any 
one time or place but is rather a movement, an interaction, 
between various times and various places. Derrida writes in 
French, in France - a France both before and after the 
evenements of 1968 - and addresses the majority of 
his work to a borderline area somewhere between the 
domains of literature and philosophy.2 As with all 
exchanges of this sort, the reaction has been one 
of a feeling of enrichment for some, along with a 
xenophobic - and sometimes crude - dismissal by others.3 
Any speculations about such contexts must indeed be 
limited here to a brief and selective background sketch, 
but within the context of Anglo-American literary 
criticism, the problem of meaning has largely been 
addressed in terms of authorial intention. 
The debate concerning authorial intention and 
its relation to the meaning of a text goes back -
within the confines of the Modern Era - to I. A. Richards 
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and the New Critics.4 W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley's 
essay "The Intentionalist Fallacy" written in 1946 postulates 
a view of the poem as being the reconciliation of opposites 
which occur and having meaning within the structure of the 
poem itself.5 The meaning of a poem, according to the 
New Critics, was not to be found in the intentions 
of its author, either during or after the moment of 
the poem's composition. In their essay "The Affective Fallacy" 
Wimsatt and Beardsley further assert that the meaning of a 
poem is not equatable with the series of responses experienced 
by the reader while reading the poem.6 For Wimsatt and 
Beardsley, the poem existed as a self-sufficient 'concrete 
universal', the meaning of which lay beyond the author's 
intentions and the reader's response. 
Literary meaning was connected by Wimsatt and Beardsley 
to principles of 'coherence' and 'complexity', principles 
which were ultimately founded upon their conceptions 
of what constituted poetry. A literary text was an 
organic whole, a series of composite units whose differences 
were reconciled to produce the coherence - even though 
such a coherence might include ambiguities - that was 
the poem. For the New Critics, the notion of literary 
discourse as a resolution of opposites governed by the 
principle of coherence provided an interpretive, as 
well as evaluative, framework that allowed the reader 
to provide a justifiable reading of the poem in the 
absence of a conjectured authorial intention. In other 
words, the New Critics operated from an aesthetically 
5 
founded critical base which justified, and indeed constituted, 
their theory of poetry. As Frank Lentricchia succinctly 
points out: 
... working within a neo-Coleridgean heritage, 
the New Critic tends, first, to ascribe, a 
priori, special objective properties to literary 
discourse (it is inherently ambiguous, or 
symbolic, or organically whole), and then, 
with circular logic, to describe the critical 
act as consisting in the location, that is, 
the finding of those qualities, wherever they 
may be.7 
This is not to say that the literary criticism of the 
New Critics was without a theoretical basis. It is 
rather that such a basis was founded upon conceptions 
of the 'literary qualities' of the text, qualities which 
were themselves a result of the theoretical practices 
which uncovered them, a process which was, indeed, circular. 
Such 'circular logic' can be seen in Wimsatt's 
distinction between the Iconic and Symbolic sign in 
his book The Verbal Icon .8 He makes this distinction 
following the American behaviourist C. W. Morris: the 
iconic sign is that which proclaims in itself certain 
properties of that which it signifies, and the symbolic 
sign is that which makes no such proclamation, its relationship 
to its referent being purely a matter of convention. 
Wimsatt then applies this distinction between the icon and 
the symbolic sign to poetry, arriving at the conclusion 
that all poetry exploits the iconic, or directly imitative 
powers of language. Such a position was later contested 
by structuralist critics who claimed that poetry did 
not exploit the 'iconic' powers of language and who 
proposed a more unified model of the sign than that 
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of Wimsatt's. 
As witnessed in Wimsatt's distinction between the 
symbolic and the iconic sign, the advent of New Criticism 
led to a greater concern with reading the text as being 
composed of distinct units of language, or signs. Rather 
than construing the poem as being merely a medium for 
authorial intention, the New Critics conceived the poem 
as being a self-contained whole which had a public meaning 
regardless of its author's intentions. This public 
meaning was not only the denotative but also the connotative 
meanings of the poem's words. The New Critics' espousal 
of the public meaning was problematic as it left unresolved 
the question as to which factor finally determined this 
'public meaning'. Was the meaning of a poem determined 
by the reconciliation of opposites within the structure 
of the poem, or was the public meaning of the poem determined 
by the sense of a vague consensus among like-minded public 
readers? In this way - as we shall later see - the 
dilemma of the New Critics' conception of public meaning 
was similar to the structuralist one, as both the New Critics 
and the structuralists were unable to locate the site of 
the production of the text's meaning. 
From the mid-sixties onwards, critics such as E. D. Hirsch 
have sought to re-establish authorial intention as the determinant 
factor in a text's meaning. Hirsch's arguments for 
re-establishing the priority of authorial intention 
emerged against the growing influence of structuralist 
and reader-response criticism in the United States. 
In Validity in Interpretation Hirsch argues that 
"to banish the original author as the determiner 
of meaning was to reject the only compelling normative 
principle that could lend validity to an interpretation".9 
For Hirsch, the absence of any such 'normative 
principle' is a source of anxiety, since without 
such a principle it becomes impossible to distinguish 
a valid interpretation of a text from an invalid 
one. Hirsch claims that the notion of authorial 
intention provides the critic with just such a 
normative principle. However, Hirsch concedes 
that his choice of authorial intention is arbitrary: 
Since it is very easy for a reader of 
any text to construe meanings that are 
different from the author's, there is 
nothing in the nature of the text itself 
which requires the reader to set up the 
author's meaning as his normative idea1.lO 
While it is conceded by Hirsch that there is no 
reason to posit the author as the determiner of 
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a text's meaning, nevertheless it must be pretended 
that authorial intention has this determining function: 
"On purely practical grounds, therefore, it is 
preferable to agree that the meaning of a text 
is the author's meaning."11 In this way, Hirsch's 
equivalence of authorial intention with the determinate 
meaning of the text is something of a functional 
fiction, since Hirsch himself concedes that such 
an equivalence does not, in itself, have to occur. 
While Hirsch seeks to reinstate the author 
as the determiner of textual meaning, his account 
of the importance of 'types' throughout Validity 
in Interpretation is similar, in some respects, 
to the structuralist project of attempting to formulate 
the rules which govern the production of meaning. 
According to Hirsch, "the determinacy and sharability 
of verbal meaning resides in its being a type. 
The particular type that it is resides in the author's 
determining will. A verbal meaning is a willed 
type 11 .12 While the author wills the type of the 
utterance, it is the conventional nature of the 
type which produces meaning. Since for Hirsch 
all meanings must be sharable in nature, it is 
the conventional, that is, sharable, character 
of 'types' which allows the text to have significance. 
However, the exact relationship between the author's 
will, the conventional nature of the type, and 
the meaning of the text is, by the end of Validity 
in Interpretation, distinctly unclear. Concerning 
the issue of implication, for example, Hirsch asserts 
that 
Implications are derived from a shared 
type that has been learned, and therefore 
the generation of implications depends on 
the interpreter's previous experience 
of the shared type. The principle for 
generating implications is, ultimately 
and in the broadest sense, a learned 
convention.13 
If the principle for generating implications is 
ultimately a 'learned convention', then one wonders 
why the generation of the text's meaning as a whole 
does not depend on just such a learned convention, 
but is instead viewed by Hirsch as being reliant 
on the author's intention. 
The concept of authorial intention remains, 
then, a problematic, despite such attempts to define 
its function, and within this context Derrida has 
a distinctive place. A deconstructive reading 
of Hirsch, for instance, would be one which sought 
the portions of Hirsch's work where the hierarchical 
ordering of the terms 'author' and 'type' were 
both temporarily inverted and displaced. Within 
such a reading, Hirsch himself would no longer 
be considered the determiner of the text's meaning, 
nor would the conventional types themselves be 
construed as producing the meaning of the text. 
A deconstructive reading of Hirsch would presumably 
concentrate on the inability of any such conventional 
types to account for all the workings of the text, 
as well as their failure to maintain their own 
self-identity. 
The purpose of this thesis is to render, as 
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clearly as possible, Derrida's critique of meaning. 
This critique involves a deconstruction of the 
logocentric conception of meaning, and a new concept 
of the force, or play, of language, a concept which 
is a non-concept, a non-word, what Derrida names 
as differance, but also as dissemination. Throughout 
this thesis, special attention is paid to authorial 
intention, not just because the subject of authorial 
intention is of general concern to literary criticism, 
but because one of the current myths surrounding 
deconstruction is that it seeks to do away with 
authorial intention altogether. Indeed, as this 
thesis shows, this is not the case. Derrida's 
9 
critique of meaning entails a meticulous, and complicated, 
re-situating of authorial intention. Authorial 
intention is re-situated by Derrida as being unable 
to control, or master, the significantional play 
of the text. Furthermore, for Derrida, authorial 
intention is never fully self-present or self-identical, 
but is always already constituted by the play of 
differance. All of these points require further 
explanation. The purpose of this thesis, once 
again, is to offer just such an explanation in 
order to provide a starting point for the understanding 
of Derrida's critique of meaning and its importance 
for modern literary theory. 
